|
|
OFFICERS ON CUSTER'S PLAN
 Frederick
Chiaventone
(left),
retired
army officer and former professor International
Security Affairs at the United States Army
Command and General
Staff
College.
(here
with Supreme Commander of Centcom and Iraq war
hero, Lieutenant General David Petraeus)Extract of the author’s note, A Road We Do Not Know, Albuquerque, University of New Mexico Press, page 13 (nominated for the Pulitzer prize):
“A few years ago,
while teaching at the Army’s Command and General
Staff College, I was fortunate enough to be
afforded a chance to revisit the site of the
battle [of the Little Bighorn] along with a
number of senior military officers for a more
in-depth look at the campaign.
The colonels and
generals of this Staff Ride, all veterans of the
Vietnam or the Gulf War, were given only the
information which was available to Custer and
his officers on 25 June 1876 and asked to
explain what they would have done in Custer’s
place.
Much to my
surprise, and theirs, all of these combat
veterans made precisely the same tactical
decisions as had the ill-fated commander of the
Seventh Cavalry.
As we walked over
the terrain and discussed the events that had
transpired on that distant summer, I found
myself looking at those events from a different
perspective.”
source:
Robert Nightengale, Little Big Horn,
FarWest Publishing pages 147-148
«For what I can
gather from
General Terry’s
instructions to
General Custer,
it is quite
evident that it
was expected, if
not expressed,
that Custer
should attack
the savages
wherever found,
and as to the
manner of attack,
of course that
was left to the
discretion
judgment of
General Custer ;
and viewing the
circumstances of
this fatal
attack from my
standpoint, I
fail to see
anything very
rash in the
planning of it,
or reckless in
its attempted
execution.
On the contrary,
I feel that
Custer would
have succeeded
had Reno with
all the reserve
of seven
companies passed
through and
joined Custer
after the first
repulse. (…)
Infantry on
expeditions
against Indians
can only be used
as guards for
supply-trains,
and in the
pursuit of
Indians upon a
mission such as
Custer’s, they
are as useless
as foxhounds in
pursuit of wild
geese."
source: US Lieutenant General (supreme commander of the army) Nelson A. Miles, Personal recollections..., The Riverside "Captain Benteen halted his men and helped to rally the battalion of Major Reno. In that vicinity, the two commands remained the entire day and night. One commander (Reno) had received positive and repeated orders from Custer to attack the enemy; the other had received Custer’s last and equally positive order to “Come on”, “Be Quick” and “Bring Packs” containing the reserve ammunition.
The courier who brought Custer’s last message was the best possible guide to be had to lead the way to Custer’s position if any direction was needed; but the sound of the rifle shots and the volleys down the river indicated exactly where the troops and ammunition were required and should have gone. (…)
 When asked what would have been the result if Reno had not retreated, the Indians frankly said that if he had not run, they would have fled. They were also asked what the consequences would have been if Reno with the seven troops had followed the Hunkpapas and Oglala when they turned and went down to the assistance of the Indians in the village, and they candidly admitted that they would have been between two fires.
In other words, the battle was lost twice, not by the action of Custer, however, for his command fought gallantly as long as it lasted, and he had given proper and judicious orders to the other commands.
“It is not expected that five troops could have whipped that body of Indians, neither it is believed that that body of Indians could have whipped twelve troops of the Seventh cavalry under Custer’s command or if his orders had been properly executed."
Read Miles' "Personal Recollections" here : |
Confederate
Major General Thomas Rosser, 1836-1910.
A favorite
of J.E.B. Stuart,
he was noted for his daring
