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RENO'S SOLDIERS: THE MAJOR WAS INCOMPETENT

sources quoted in the text

SOTMSCharge.jpgMajor Marcus Reno attracted  the Indians by attacking them, and Fred Gerard and Sergeant Davern, Reno's orderly, said that it was exactly what Custer wanted : "to bring Indians to battle" (Gerard). Not to "charge the village", as Reno said in 1879, but to "charge", as Reno wrote it in 1876. Indians were believed to be fleeing, Custer had to force them to stop. To bring them to battle. And it worked. Major Marcus Reno, commandant de bataillon

Reno's position in the timber was strong, much stronger that Reno said afterwards to explain his rout. Lieutenant Hare testified at the Reno Court of Inquiry (RCOI) that the troops were not fighting the entire Indian forces and that the field itself was good for fighting: deep woods, with a kind of breastwork which protected the soldiers from the Indian fire.

Indians had a lot of difficulties to go in the timber, suffered casualties (two warchiefs) and didn't want to fight around Reno anymore. Red Feather testified that the position was very good and that the Indians were frustrated to be shot down without hurting the soldiers. SOTMSSkirmishLine.jpg

Cheyenne chiefs told George B. Grinnell that if Reno had hold the timber, they would have never defeated him, an opinion which was shared by Lieutenant Hare, Lieutenant DeRudio (the position was "impregnable", Reno could have hold it "four hours"), Fred Gerard and almost all the officers of the batalion. Indians testified that chiefs even warned their warriors not to attack the timber.

When Reno left the timber without any organization, Indians were very surprised by the movement and most of all told interviewers that it was the strangest movement of the battle. They didn't understand why Reno had left while he was in the strongest position. It was a tactical disaster.

US general in chief Miles, Reno Court of Inquiry chairman Jesse Lee, Colonel Gibbon and most of the officers of Reno's batalion (except Captain Moylan, who had left the woods with Reno, and McIntosh, who was killed during the rout) agreed that the position was good. Lee even said that it was the strongest position of all the battlefield, and Lieutenant Hare, of Reno's batalion, said that holding the timber was evidently made to support Custer's flank attack against the village.

But no flank attack was ever made, because Reno left the village after only 30 minutes of light fight (Fred Gerard spent 21 bullets, the men in general 30 to 40 according to Gerard, Davern spent 13, Culbertson spent 20) - and Custer's attack was already failing, but not because of Custer's plan.

The plan was good - attacking in front of the village, to stop the body of Indians, an attack in the flank, to surprise and defeat them. According to bugler Martini, Custer's plan was this (Martini heard Custer telling this to his subordinates) : Reno in the fron of the village, Benteen in the center and Custer in the extreme opposite. Altough Benteen and Reno later said that Custer didn't tell us anything, in fact, he did, and Martini heard it.

 

THE OPINIONS OF RENO'S SOLDIERS

Reno proved incompetent and Benteen showed his indifference – I will not use the uglier words that have often been in my mind. Both failed Custer and he had to fight it alone. […] Among the several things that impressed me greatly, one was the general demoralization that seemed to pervade many of the officers and men, due in great measure, I think, to Major Reno. When an enlisted man sees his commanding officers showing greater regard for their personal safety than anything else, it would apt to demoralize anyone taught to breathe, almost, at the word of command.

Private William Taylor, Company M, 7th cavalry, after Little Bighorn

(Sklenar, Larry, To Hell with Honor, pp.260-261)

lieutgodfrey.jpg "As it turned out I think Custer did make a mistake in going in with a divided force, not that the division of itself would have been fatal but because Reno failed to hold a leg even if he couldn’t skin."

Lieutenant Edward Godfrey, Company K, 7th cavalry, after Little Bighorn

(Sklenar, Larry, To Hell with Honor, p.262)

"...I always felt that Major Reno utterly failed in his part in the valley attack in the disposition of his command when he fell back in the old stream bed; that he failed to exercise any fire control; that he could and should have held that position....Having made the decision to retreat, he made no disposition to cover that retreat or to properly inform the command of such decision; that he in person led a panic, straggling retreat, hereby sacrificing many lives and the morale of his command. The shock from the killing of Bloody Knife at his side or near him seems to have bereft him of the sense of official responsibility and to impel him to seek safety in flight. "

Lieutenant Edward Godfrey, Company K, 7th cavalry, after Little Bighorn

(letter to Agent Asbury in 1929)

 

Lieutenant Charles DeRudio, compagnie E, assigné à la compagnie A"Reno’s position [in the timber] was impregnable and nothing but fear could have prompted his retreat. "

Lieutenant Charles DeRudio, Company M, 7th cavalry, after Little Bighorn

(Sklenar, Larry, To Hell with Honor, p.365)

 

 

Capitaine Thomas French, compagnie M"What made Major Reno run away when he did I cannot positively know, and he didn’t tell me. […] To turn ones back on Indians without being better mounted than they is throwing away life. When he started to that hill he had told me, not one minute before, that he was going to fight – it was in reply to a question of mine."

Captain Thomas French, Company M, 7th cavalry, after Little Bighorn

(Graham, William, The Custer Myth, p.341)

"I should have shot him (Major Reno) that day."

Captain Thomas French, Company M, 7th cavalry, after Little Bighorn

("Marcus A. Reno: What was said of him at the Little Big Horn", Arrow and Trooper )